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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
ARNIE R. GREEN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
THE LANG COMPANY, INC., a Cor-
poration, LEONARD CHIPMAN 
LIVESTOCK COMPANY, a Corpo-
ration, JULION CLAWSON, SR., and 
JULION CLAWSON, JR., 




This is an appeal from a judgment made and entered in 
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, LEONARD 
CHIPMAN LIVESTOCK COMPANY, a Corporation, JUL. 
ION CLAWSON, SR., and JUL10N CDA!WSON, JR. The 
case was tried before the Honorable Judge A. H. Ellett, sit-
ting without a jury. At the conclusion of the evidence he 
found the issues in favor of the plaintiff and allowed him 
general and special damages in the sum of $3,030.00, but 
deducted therefrom the sum of $1,250.00 which had been 
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paid by defendant, Lang Company Incorporated, to the 
plaintiff in consideration of a covenant not to sue said 
Lang Company by the plaintiff and a dismissal of the action 
as to it. 
STATE~MENT OF FACTS 
The following facts were either duly admitted by the 
defendants Leonard Chipman Livestock Company, a cor-
poration, Julion Clawson, Sr., and Julion Clawson, Jr. or 
were undisputed in the evidence : That the Leonard Chip-
man Livestock Company is and was a corporation organ-
ized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the 
State of Utah and engaged in a general ranching business, 
with its principal place of business in Salt Lake City, Utah; 
that the defendant, Julion Clawson, Sr., is a resident of 
Salt Lake City and President of said Leonard oChipman Live-
tock Company; that Julion Clawson, Jr., is a minor of the 
age of 15 years, and is a son of defendant, J ulion Clawson, 
Sr.; that Second South Street is a paved, public highway 
extending in a generally easterly and westerly direction 
through Salt Lake City, Utah; that Seventh West Street :.1 
is likewise a paved, public highway extending in a gener- :.G 
ally northerly and southerly direction through said city; 
that the defendant, Leonard Chipman Livestock Company, 
a corporation, had purchased from the Lang Company, Inc., 
a corporation, certain iron casings, and that the said Leonard p 
Chipman Livestock Company, acting through its President, 
Julion Clawson, Sr., on or about June 16th, 1947, directed 
the defendant, Julion Clawson, Jr., to drive a truck which 
was the property of said Leonard Chipman Livestock Com-
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pany, to said Lang Company, Inc., and there obtain said 
casings; that said Julion Clawson, Jr., drove said truck to 
said Lang Company, Inc., and the agents, servants and em-
ployees of said Lang Company, Inc., loaded the casings onto 
said truck; that said truck so loaded was driven by the said 
Julion Clawson, Jr., to the place of business of Salt Lake 
Transportation Company and there the said J ulion Clawson, 
Sr., inspected said load and concluded that the said truck 
was not properly loaded and directed the said J ulion Claw-
son, Jr., to drive said truck to said Lang Company, Inc., and 
have said truck reloaded, and that the said J ulion Clawson, 
Jr., as directed did drive said truck to the said Lang Com-
pany, Inc., place of business and had said truck reloaded, and 
certain of said pipe removed therefrom; that at said time 
the said Julion Clawson, Jr., was a minor of the age of 15 
years and had no license, permit or authority to drive said 
truck or any other motor vehicle, all of which the Livestock 
Co. and the Clawsons well knew. 
That there was on said truck at the time that said 
Julion Clawson, Jr., drove said truck to the Lang Company, 
Inc., the first time and when he left said Lang Company, 
Inc., and when he returned thereto, an automobile rim with 
a tube and tire thereon, which is hereafter referred to as 
a wheel, which was the property of said defendant, Leonard 
Chipman Livestock Company and was an accessory to said 
truck, and when necessary, could and was used by said 
company as an extra wheel for the truck; that there was 
no rack or other place especially provided to carry said 
wheel on said truck and the same was usually carried on 
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the floor of the truck but with the casings thereon said 
wheel could not be placed on the floor of the truck. 
That when said Lang Company, Inc., reloaded said 
pipe, the employees of said Lang Company placed said 
wheel between the back of the cab and a stake projecting 
from a slot. That at said time the said Julion Clawson, Jr., 
saw the manner in which said wheel was placed on said 
truck and asked the employee of said Lang Company, Inc., 
who had reloaded said pipe if said wheel would be safe, and 
received the reply that he, the said employee, thought it 
would be safe; that said wheel was not secured in any man-
ner and was in such condition and position on said truck 
that in the driving of said truck the pipe thereon could and 
did move against the same. 
That the said, Julion Clawson, Jr., with the said 
pipe so reloaded and the said wheel so placed on said truck 
drove from said Lang Company, Inc., on said Second South 
Street and towards the intersection of said Second South 
and Seventh West Streets aforesaid, a distance of approxi-
mately five city blocks; that in driving said truck he drove 
at a speed varying from 15 to 2~5 miles per hour; that at 
various places along the course of travel the said road was 
rough and bumpy; that the driving of said truck over said 
highway at the rate of speed which it was driven caused 
the said pipe so loaded on said truck to move against said 
wheel and it became loosened from its position between the 
back of the cab and the stake, and was thereby caused to 
roll and fall from the truck and injure plaintiff. 
1 
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That the said Julion Clawson, Jr., drove said truck 
at a rate of speed that was not reasonable or proper under 
the circumstances and he was guilty of negligence in driv-
ing at such rate of speed in view of the condition of the 
highway, the load upon said truck and the manner in which 
' said wheel was placed thereon. 
That the plaintiff on said 16th day of June, 1947, 
was in the employ of Salt Lake City and was engaged in mix-
ing paint preparatory to painting certain marks and lines 
upon said Second South Street immediately west of said 
__ intersection, and that while doing said work he was in the 
course of his employment, and while so working said wheel 
by reason of the negligent manner in which said truck was 
driven and operated by the said defendant, Julion Clawson, 
Jr., as heretofore set forth, fell therefrom and struck upon 
-· and against plaintiff's right leg, thereby causing a com-
minuted fracture of the bones of said leg between the knee 
and the ankle. 
That plaintiff was immediately taken to the Holy 
- Cross Hospital where he was confined from said 16th day 
of June, 1947, until the 25th day of June, 19-47; that he was 
compelled to expend for said hospital care and treatment the 
sum of $153.00; that by reason of his said injuries he was 
compelled to and did receive surgical and medical care and 
attention and has paid therefor the sum of $277.00. That at 
the time of receiving said injuries he was earning $200.00 
·~ per month and that he was unable to do any work whatever 
-~ for a period of five and one-half months, to his further 
damage in the sum of $1100.00, a total of special damages 
of $15-30.00. 
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The Court allowed general damages in the sum of 
$1500.00, a total in all of $3030.00. 
The evidence showed that the plaintiff, together -~ 
with Willard Hanson, his attorney, on or about the 7th day ;_ 1 
of June, 1948, and prior to the trial herein, entered into an 
agreement with the Lang Company, Inc., a corporation, 
whereby for the consideration of $1250.00, the plaintiff dis-
missed said action without prejudice against said Lang 
Company, Inc., and agreed not to sue or prosecute or make 
any claims or demands against the Lang Company, Inc., a _:: 
corporation, by reason of his injuries, and they agreed fur- _; 
ther to indemnify and save said company harmless for any 
claim that the said defendants, Leonard Chipman Livestock :-J 
Company, a corporation, Julion Clawson, Sr., and Julion -:~· 
Clawson, Jr., or any of them, might make against said Lang 
Company, Inc., by reason of said accident and injuries to 
plaintiff. 
The plaintiff duly filed his objections to the Findings 
and Conclusions of the Court and submitted Findings, Con-
clusion and a Judgment which he claimed reflected the law 
and the evidence in the case. In these Findings, Conclusion 
and Decree he proposed that the Livestock Company and 
the two Clawsons were liable for the full amount of the 
judgment and that The Lang Company was in no way liable 
or responsible for the accilent or injuries to him. It was 
the plaintiff's contention during the trial of this matter and 
it is his contention on this appeal that the Court erred in 
Findings and Conclusions that The Lang Company was a 
joint tort-feasor with the other defendants; the only pur-
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pose of this appeal so far as the plaintiff is concerned, is to 
have this Honorable Court determine whether or not the 
defendant, The Lang Company was a joint tort-feasor with 
the other defendants and whether the payment by it of the 
$1250.00, on a covenant not to sue should be allowed the 
other defendants. 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS 
1. The Court erred in finding that the defendant, The 
Lang Company, was a joint tort-feasor with the other de-
fendants. 
2. The Court erred in refusing to make and enter the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law and Judgment and De-
"· cree as proposed by the plaintiff. 
3. The Court erred in allowing the defendant, Live-
stock Company and the Cia wson defendants a set-off for 
the amount paid by The Lang Company in consideration 
.. of the covenant not to sue. 
ARGUMENT 
For the purpose of this argument all of the above errors 
~- may be considered together. If the defendant, The ~Lang 
~· Company was a joint tort-feasor with the other defendants 
- then the other defendants would be entitled to an off-set or 
, credit against the judgment for the amount paid by The Lang 
;:z Company. 
It is the plaintiff's contention that The Lang Company 
is not a joint tort feasor and in no way proximately con-
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tributed to the accident or injury to the plaintiff; that the 
loading upon the truck of the wheel by the employees of ' 
The Lang Company was not a part of the business which 
the defendants had with the Lang Company and that merely 
because the employees of The Lang Company took it upon 
themselves to load the wheel could not in any way bind The 
Lang Company, it being without the scope of their employ- '1j 
ment. Further it will be remembered that the defendant 
Julion Clawson, Jr., drove and operated the truck a distance 
of approximately five blocks before the wheel fell from the 
truck and that even though it might be said that The Lang 
Company was responsible for the loading of the wheel at 
its place of business and was negligent in so loading it, such 
negligence is so remote and so far removed from the time 
of the accident that it cannot be said to be a contributing ·· 
factor thereto. The Livestock Company had purchased the 
pipe from The Lang Company and had sent its truck there 
to have the pipe loaded upon it. The loading of the wheel 
upon the truck was not ~ part of the contract or the business 
which the Livestock Company had with The Lang Company. 
It was merely an accommodation rendered to the Livestock 
Company and the other defendants by the employees of H 
The Lang Company. 
In other words the sole and only question involved in 
this case is whether or not the negligence of The Lang , 
Company, if any, in loading the wheel upon the truck of I 
the other defendants, was the proximate or contributing l~ 
cause of the injury sustained by the plaintiff or was it a 
remote cause or was the negligence of the other defendants I 
in driving the truck too fast over a bumpy road the sole 
~ 
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proximate cause of the accident and injury sustained by 
plaintiff. Ordinarily the question of proximate cause is 
one of fact for the jury or the court sitting without a jury. 
This court so held in the case of Anderson vs. Bransford, 
39 Utah 256, 116 Pac. 1023. There the court held that 
this is so because different conclusions generally arise on 
a conflict of the evidence or because of different deductions 
or inferences arising from the undisputed facts, in respect 
to the question of whether the injury was the natural and 
probable consequences of the proved negligence or wrongful 
act, and ought to have been foreseen in the light of the 
attending circumstances. But the court further held, in 
the cited- case, that where there is no conflict and where 
but one deduction or inference is permissible then the ques-
tion of proximate cause is one of law. 
It is the contention of the plaintiff in the case at bar 
that there is only one permissible inference and that is that 
the direct and proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff 
was the negligence of the defendants, Leonard Chipman 
Livestock Co., Julion Clawson, Sr., and Julion Clawson, Jr. 
and that but for their negligence plaintiff would not have 
been injured and that no negligence on the part of the de-
fendant, The Lang Company, caused or produced or set 
in motion or concurred in the negligence of the other defen-
dants. 
Proximate cause has been defined by this court in the 
case of Strong vs. Granite Furniture Company, 77 Utah 292, 
294 Pac. 303, 78 A. L. R. 465, as follows: 
"The proximate cause of an injury is the primary 
moving cause without which it would not have been 
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inflicted, but which, in natural and probable sequence 
of events, and without the intervention of any new or 
independent cause, produces the injury." 
The question arises as to whether or not the acts of neg-
ligence upon the part of the defendants Livestock Co. and 
Clawsons were intervening or independent causes which 
produced the injury to the plaintiff and were thus the proxi-
mate cause relieving The Lang Company from liability. 
The negligence of The Lang Company, if any, is too 
remote to constitute the proximate cause or a proximate con .. 
tributing cause of plaintiff's injury. The case of Strong vs. 
Granite Furniture Company (supra) is a good example of 
the problem in question. In that case the defendant Furni-
ture Company had gone to the plaintiff's home to there re-
possess furniture and in the act of repossessing the same, 
according to the plaintiff's contention, had entered the plain-
tiff's home by unfastening a window through which its 
employees entered the house, that upon leaving the house 
with the furniture, the defendant had failed to relock the 
window and that because of such failure some person un-
known to either the plaintiff or defendant, entered plain-
tiff's home and carried away certain personal property of 
the plaintiff of the value of $500.00 The court held that the 
negligence of the defendant in leaving the window unlatched 
was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's loss but that the 
intervening act of the person who carried away plaintiff's 
property was the proximate cause and was an independent 
act that could not be reasonably foreseen by the defendant. 
The Restatement of the Law of Torts, Chap. 16, P. 828, 
Sec. 441, says, "An intervening force is one which actually 
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operates in producing harm to another after the actor's neg-
ligent act or omission has been committed." In other words, 
a prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an 
action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish 
the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury 
was made possible, if there intervened between such prior 
or remote cause and the injury, a distinct, successive, unre-
lated and efficient cause of the injury, even though such 
injury would not have happened but for such condition or 
occasion. 
A good example of the above statement is the case of 
Anderson vs. Bransford, (supra). In that case the plaintiff 
went to the rear of the defendant's apartment house to de-
liver some laundry. In order to reach the rear of the build-
ing it was necessary for her to go along a narrow alleyway, 
at the side of which was an unguarded cellar way. Plaintiff 
had delivered the laundry and was returning to the street 
by way of the alley when she encountered a horse and wagon 
near the open cellar way. The horse made a movement which 
frightened the plaintiff and the plaintiff in attempting to 
get away from the horse, fell into the unguarded cellar way. 
The court held that the unguarded cellar way was but a 
condition which, under the circumstances of the case, ex-
posed the plaintiff to no danger and would have produced 
no damage or injury to her had it not been for the indepen-
dent, unrelated, direct and efficient cause of the plaintiff 
being frightened by the horse and falling into the unguarded 
cellar way. In the case at bar the loading of the wheel upon 
the truck by the defendant, The Lang Company, was done 
some five blocks away from the point of the accident in 
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question. It was but a remote cause and did nothing more 
than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by 
which the injury was made possible. The negligence of 
the defendants Clawsons in failing to see that the wheel was 
properly secured and in driving and operating the truck at 
a speed too high for the condition of the road were such 
distinct, successive and unrelated and efficient causes as 
to relieve the Lang Company, if it were negligent in the 
first instance, from any liability whatsoever. 
In the case of Williams vs. Weidman, 135 Mich. 444, 
97 N. W. 966, a butcher sold a beef carcass to a retailer 
without notice that the beef was infected. The retailer's 
clerk was cutting the carcass up and got blood poisoning. 
The court held that the act of the butcher in selling the beef 
was not the proximate cause of the clerk getting blood pois-
oning when he discovered the putrid condition of the carcass 
before he attempted to cut the same. 
See also the case of Furlong vs. Roberts, 164 App. Div. 
458, 1'50 N. Y. S. 166, where the defendant laid a beam 
23. feet long and ten inches square and weighing about 800 
lbs. on the south side of a street to defend the supports of 
a wooden bridge over the street. The beam was not fastened 
or anchored in any way and an express wagon passing 
through the street collided with the end of the beam and 
pushed it along so that it struck and injured plaintiff. The 
court held that the laying of the beam in the street and the 
failure to secure it was not the proximate cause of the in-
jury as the striking thereof by the wagon was an indepen-
dent, intervening cause. So in the case at bar the placing 
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of the wheel upon the truck by the Lang Company cannot 
possibly be a proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff. 
The driving of the truck by the defendant, Julion Clawson, 
Jr. over a bumpy road at a high speed which could not 
be foreseen by the Lang Company. It could not possibly 
know that the driver would not exercise due care. 
An interesting case and one which is directly in point 
with the case at bar is the case of Baughn vs. Plq,tt, 123 Texas 
486, 72 S. W. (2nd) 580. There the action was brought 
to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have 
resulted from the negligence of two or more defendants. 
One of the defendants was the owner and driver of a truck, 
the other defendants owned an ice company. The defendant 
driver stopped his truck at the ice plant of the defendant 
Ice Company and purchased a 100 pound block of ice which 
employees of the ice company placed on the right running 
board of defendant driver's car and tied the same with com-
mon binding twine. The defendant driver then proceeded 
towards his home some four miles away. The road was paved 
and about twenty feet wide but was made so as to slope 
away from the center. Plaintiff was walking on the right 
hand side of the road approximately eight feet from the 
paved portion when the defendant driver overtook him 
while he was driving between 30 to 35 miles per hour. The 
road was rough and bumpy at the point where defenaant 
driver overtook plaintiff and the ice slid from the running 
board across the road, striking the plaintiff. The string 
around the ice had come untied but had not broken. 
The Ice Company contended that the act of its servant 
in depositing the ice on the running board of the car, in-
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eluding the manner in which it was tied was too remote 
from the event of the plaintiff's injuries to be considered 
the proximate cause thereof. The court held that it could 
not be said that the putting of the ice on the running board, 
including the attendant circumstances was the proximate 
cause of plaintiff's injuries. 
The court in discussing proximate case, stated that in 
order to warrant a finding that an injury is the proximate 
result of an act of negligence whether by commission or 
omission, it must appear that the injury was the natural and 
probable consequence of the negligent act complained of and 
that the party committing the negligent act ought to have 
foreseen such consequences in the light of the attending cir-
cumstances. 
The court further said, 
"When we come to apply the rule above an-
nounced to the facts of this case, we are convinced 
that the event of the depositing of the ice on the run-
ning board of the car including the manner of tying it 
by the servant of the Ice Company was too far re-
moved, that is too remote from the event of plaintiff's 
injury to permit it to be said that the former was the 
proximate cause of the latter. In other words we think 
it can not be said that the servant of the Ice Company 
ought to have anticipated or foreseen that his act 
would result in plaintiff's injuries. In connection 
with the above, we call your attention to the fact that 
at all times here involved, defendant driver was his 
own master. The Ice Company had no control over 
him or his car. They had no authority to direct or 
suggest how he should drive going to his home or to 
direct the manner in which he should drive. The de-
fendant driver knew the ice was resting on the run-
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ning board and was only tied with binding twine. 
He was the master and in full and exclusive control of 
· his own car on which he was transporting his own 
ice and while he was traveling fast over a rough and 
bumpy road." 
The case at bar is even stronger than the above cited 
case. In the case at bar the Lang Company employees were 
merely accommodating the defendants Clawsons in placing 
the wheel in the position in which they did. They had not 
purchased the wheel from The Lang Company as had the 
plaintiff purchased the ice in the above cited case. The 
employees of the ice Company were certainly in the course 
of their employment in placing the ice upon the plaintiff's 
car but in the case at bar the placing of the wheel upon the 
defendant Clawson's truck was without the scope of the 
employees of The Lang Company authority and was at most 
a mere accommodation to the defendant Clawsons and the 
Livestock Co. 
The defendant Julion Clawson, Jr. was in full control 
of the truck which he was driving. The Lang Company had 
no right to tell him the road to drive upon or the manner 
in which he should drive his truck. 
The defendant, Julion Clawson, Jr. knew that the wheel 
was not fastened in any manner and at no time during his 
drive over the bump road did he take time to see whether 
the wheel was still riding safely on the truck. 
Another interesting case and a case which throws a 
great deal of light on the situation involved in the case at 
the bar is the case of Looney vs. Bingham Dairy, et al., 75 
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Utah 5·3, 282 Pac. 1030, 73 A. L. R. 327. In that case the 
plaintiff was requested by an employee of the Dairy Com-
pany to help drive one of the Dairy Company's horses into 
the barn. The plaintiff went behind the horse in an effort 
to get it in the barn when the horse suddenly kicked him 
in the face. The plaintiff contends that the defendant Dairy 
Company was negligent in temporarily leaving the horse 
loose and unattended in the barn yard. The court held, how-
ever, that it was the unauthorized act of the defendant em-
ployee in requesting the plaintiff to drive the horse in the 
barn that caused the injuries and that had'it not been for the 
unauthorized act of the employee the injury would not have :i 
happened. In other words, this Honorable Court held that 
assuming the Dairy Company was negligent in the first 
instance in leaving the horse untied and loose in the barn 
yard, still it was the intervening unauthorized act of the 
Dairy Company employee in requesting the plaintiff to drive 
the horse into the barn that was responsible for the injuries 
to plaintiff. 
It is clear from the foregoing authorities that in order 
to hold two or more persons as joint tort feasors, their acts 
must proximately cause or contribute to the accident and 
resulting injury; that where a prior and remote cause did 
nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the 
occasion and there is an intervening act between such prior 
or remote cause and the injury, a distinct, successive, unre-
lated and efficient cause of the injury, then the prior and 
remote cause cannot be said to be the proximate cause of 
the injury and the parties will not be considered joint tort 
feasors. 
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The case at bar clearly falls within the rule announced 
by the above cases. The act of The Lang Company, even 
though it can be said to have been a negligent act, was one 
which was so remote from the time of the accident that it 
cannot be said to be a contributing cause thereto. The in-
tervening acts of the defendant Julion Clawson, Jr. was one 
which could not be anticipated by the Lang Company nor 
was it one which it could control and was such an act as to 
cut off the negligence of The Lang Company if any, and 
place the responsibility solely upon the Livestock Company 
and the Clawsons. Thus it is apparent that the trial court 
erred in making and entering its finding of fact and conclu-
sion of law to the effect that all of the defendants were joint 
tort feasors and this Honorable Court should make and 
enter its order directing the trial court to make and enter 
its findings, conclusions and judgment as prepared and sub-
mitted by the plaintiff and allow the plaintiff the full amount 
of the judgment entered solely against the Livestock Com-
pany and the Cia wsons. 
That the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies to the 
Livestock Company and the Clawsons cannot be questioned. 
They were the owners of the truck and wheel in question and 
the same were under their exclusive jurisdiction and con-
trol, and the falling of the wheel from the truck was some-
thing that in the ordinary course of events would not have 
happened had the Livestock Company and the Clawsons ex-
ercised that degree of care required of them. An inference 
or presumption of negligence arises from the falling of tne 
wheel and the striking of the same against the plaintiff. 
That the doctrine applies, see the following cases: 
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Furkovich vs. Bingham Coal and Lumber Com-
pany, 45 Utah 89, 143 Pacific 121, 
Angerman vs. Edgeman, 7·6 Utah 394, 290 Pa-
cific 169, 
Laos vs. Mt. Fuel Supply Company, et al., 108 
Pac. (2nd) 254, 
Hayward vs. Downing and Wright vs. Downing, 
189 Pac. (2nd) 442. 
There is no question but what the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur would not have applied to the Lang Company and 
there is no showing by the defendants nor is there any evi-
dence in the record whatsoever that the Lang Company did 
not follow the instructions as to the loading of the wheel as 
given them by the defendant, Julion Clawson, Sr., nor is 
there any evidence that the same could have been loaded by 
them any differently than it was. 
The defendants, the Livestock Company and Clawsons 
are desirous, of course, in holding The Lang Company and 
assert its negligence contributed to plaintiff's injuries. We 
have heretofore shown that whatever negligence there was 
on the part of The Lang Company was not a proximate cause 
of the accident in question. If The Lang Company were 
negligent, its negligence was only a remote cause for which 
it could not be held liable. It, in no sense, could be consid-
ered a joint tort feasor. The court in its Findings makes 
The Lang Company a joint tort feasor and says: 
"That the employees of said Lang Company so 
negligently placed said wheel between the back of the 
cab and a stake projecting from a slot that it was not 
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so firmly fixed as to remain in place if there should 
be any movement of the pipes loaded as aforesaid; 
and that the Lang Company knew, or in the exercise 
of reasonable care should have known that said loaded 
pipes would shift their position in transit and would 
cause said wheel to be hurled from said truck and 
onto the ground." (See the Findings of Fact by the 
Court, Tr. 46.) 
The finding "that the employees of said Lang Company 
so negligently placed said wheel between the back of the 
~, cab and the stake projecting from a slot that it was not so 
firmly fixed as to remain in place if there should be any 
movement of the pipes loaded as aforesaid," is but a mere 
·- conclusion. There is no evidence whatever to justify the 
finding that it was "negligently placed" between the back 
-- of the cab and the stake. So far as the evidence shows, there 
was no other place that the wheel could be placed. 
The court further found (Par. 6, Tr. 47) that the de-
fendant Julion Clawson, Jr. drove the truck at a rate of 
- speed that was not reasonable or proper under the circum-
stances and he was guilty of negligence in driving at such 
> rate of speed in view of the condition of the highway and 
.:· the load upon said truck and the manner in which said wheel 
was placed thereon. That finding, of course, is supported 
· c by the evidence. If that finding is correct then it must have 
:p: been the negligence of Julion Clawson, Jr., in driving the 
truck in such manner that he did over the rough road that 
was the proximate cause of the accident in question. That 
::~ being the case, there was no negligence of the Lang Com-
;j: 
pany that could proximately contribute to the accident in ~~; 
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question. Julion Clawson, Jr., had assisted in the loading 
of the wheel (Tr. 78). He knew the manner in which it was 
loaded. He had asked the employee of The Lang Company 1 
who loaded it if it was safe and the employee replied 
that he thought it was. Julion Clawson, Jr., testified that 
the pavement was very rough and jolty and that it was so 
rough and jolty that the pipes would move and go against 
the wheel and knock it loose (Tr. 89~90). In view of that 
testimony, how can it be said that The Lang Company was 
a joint tort feasor? The witness further testified that he 
never, at any time after leaving The Lang Company, ex-
amined the load or the wheel to see how the wheel or the 
pipes were riding (Tr. 90). 
Further, the manner in which the truck was reloaded 
and the way the wheel was placed on the truck was well 
known to the defendants, Livestock Company and the Claw-
sons. Those defendants cannot be heard to say that J ulion 
Clawson, Jr., was a young boy and did not fully understand 
how the loading should be done. He was the agent of his 
father and also the Livestock Company. He was sent to The 
Lang Company for the purpose of having the pipe reloaded 
and of taking the load away. His negligence cannot in any 
way be attributed to The Lang Company, and even though 
this Court should find that the employees of The Lang Com-
pany had authority to load the wheel and that it was not 
properly loaded, still this Court cannot say, in view of the 
evidence, that the failure of employees of The Lang Company 
in any manner or form proximately contributed to the ac-
-cident in question. Under the statute, Title 4 7, Sections 
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{ 4-0-1 to 4-0-5 U. C. A. 1943, the amount of the considera-
tion received from one or more of the joint tort feasors can 
be credited pro tanto to the other joint tort feasors. But, 
in order that a joint tort feasor be allowed the credit paid 
by the other, the parties must stand in the relation of joint 
tort feasors to the injured person. In other words, the negli-
gence of the tort feasors must have proximately contributed 
to the injuries. The obligation must be joint. It must be a 
case where the injured person could sue and obtain a judg-
ment against any one or all of the tort feasors. If the plain-
tiff had attempted to hold The Lang Company alone, would 
this Court have upheld a judgment obtained against it under 
the undisputed evidence in the case. The mere fact that the 
plaintiff did finally join The Lang Company as a defendant 
is no evidence that it is a joint tort feasor. The fact that 
The Lang Company was willing to buy its peace and pay 
plaintiff a consideration to dismiss the action against it 
and obtain a covenant not to sue is not evidence that The 
Lang Company is liable as a joint tort feasor or otherwise. 
A perusal of the evidence will not disclose any negli-
gence whatever on the part of The Lang Company, and if 
there were negligence it is so remote that it has no causal 
connection with the accident and the resulting injuries to 
the plaintiff. 
We respectfully submit that this Court should order the 
trial court to vacate that portion of the judgment wherein 
... · the trial court allowed credit to the Livestock Company and 
: .... 
;): the Clawsons of $1,2,50.00 paid by The Lang Company and 
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should require the trial court to enter judgment against the 
defendants, the Leonard Chipman Livestock Company, Jul-
ion Clawson, Sr., and Julion Clawson, Jr., for the entire 
amount of damages which the court found had been sus-
tained by the plaintiff, to wit, $3,030.00. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILLARD HANSON, 
STEW ART M. HANSON, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Appellant. 
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